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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on recent political theory that asks what the relationship between inclusive 
deliberation and oppositional activism is in processes of democratization, we develop a 
case study of environmental justice mobilisation in post-apartheid South Africa. We 
focus on the emergence of a network of social movement organisations embedded in 
particular localities in the city of Durban, connected into national and transnational 
campaigns, and centred on grievances around industrial air pollution. We analyse how the 
geographies of uneven industrial and urban development in Durban combine with 
sedimented place-based histories of activism to make particular locations spaces of 
democratic contention, where the scope and operation of formal democratic procedures 
are challenged and transformed. We examine the range of strategic engagements adopted 
by social movement organisations in pursuing their objectives, looking in particular at the 
dynamic interaction between inclusion in deliberative forums and more adversarial, 
activist strategies of legal challenge and dramaturgical protest. We identify the key 
organisational features of organisations involved in this environmental justice network 
which both enable and constrain particular patterns of democratic engagement with the 
state and capital. We also identify a disjuncture between the interpretative frames of 
different actors involved in participatory policy making.  Both of these factors help to 
explain the difficulties faced by social movement organisations in opening up the space 
for legitimate non-parliamentary opposition in a political culture marked by norms of 
conciliation and consensus.  
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1). Inclusion, opposition and democratization 
During and after the negotiated transition from apartheid to formal democracy in the 
1990s, South African politics has been shaped by a strong impulse towards the inclusion 
of potential antagonists within networks of state patronage and policy-making (Robinson 
1998). In this paper we use a case study of the politics of environmental justice in the 
South African city of Durban to explore the degree to which inclusion is the only criteria 
by which to assess the process of democratization (Dryzek 1996, Young 2000).
1
 We 
examine the dynamic between inclusion in deliberative policy forums and governance 
structures on the one hand, and adversarial activism on other, arguing that this dynamic 
shapes the forms of democratic opposition that emerge in diverse public spheres. 
Understanding the relationships between activism and deliberation has become a key 
theme of recent democratic theory (Young 2001). Of particular relevance to the 
discussion here is literature raising the question of whether theories of agonistic 
democracy can provide the relevant criteria for the analysis of democratization in 
divided, highly unequal societies (e.g. Dryzek 2002, Kapoor 2002, Slater 2002).  
Since the late 1990s there has been a sharp increase in environmental activism in South 
Africa, shaped by discourses of environmental justice and often focussed on contested 
programmes of industrial development (see Bond 2002). This coincides with a broader 
resurgence of social movement politics including activism around land rights, HIV/AIDS 
activism, and basic service delivery (Ballard 2005). The emergence of an environmental 
justice movement in the post-apartheid period has connected a long-standing 
                                            
1
 This paper draws on collaborative research by the authors since 2001, including documentary analysis, 
interviews with key actors, and participatory action research with community-based organizations. The 
research was supported by a Leverhulme Trust Research Interchange Grant entitled ‘New Spaces of 
Democracy in Post-apartheid Durban’.     
 4 
conservation movement, traditionally the preserve of privileged white communities, with 
the concerns about everyday spaces of social reproduction that characterise poor 
communities suffering from a long history of systematic environmental racism (Barnett 
2003, Cock 2004).  
The significance of the locally embedded, but nationally and transnationally networked 
environmental justice movement we discuss here needs to be located in the wider context 
of debates about the unfolding logic of oppositional politics in South African democracy. 
Given the ANC’s overwhelming electoral dominance, Butler (2003) argues that analytic 
attention should shift to the role of non-electoral mechanisms in holding government to 
account and checking the abuse of centralised power. Accordingly, the significance of the 
networked environmental politics that has emerged in Durban and beyond for the 
institutionalisation of democratic opposition in South Africa can be assessed along two 
axes (cf. Stephan 1997, 657): in terms of its effectiveness in projecting new issues of 
contention into the public sphere; and in terms of its effectiveness in generating new 
mechanisms of democratic accountability. Environmental policy-making in South Africa 
has seen the growth of what Dryzek (1994, 188) calls “incipient discursive designs”, such 
as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIAs), right-to-know legislation, regulatory 
mediation, and public hearings. These are imperfect approximations of the deliberative 
ideals that have been ascribed such importance in post-liberal and radical theories of 
democracy. Our question is how this sort of ‘incipient discursive designs’ play out when 
transplanted to the South African context and placed alongside other, longer standing 
practices of oppositional political engagement. What sorts of democratic values are 
actually enacted in the functioning of these deliberative practices? And what sorts of 
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values are enacted in the contestation of these discursive designs?  
Section 2 discusses the spatialities that come together to South Durban a distinctive site 
of contentious politics. Section 3 analyses the dynamic of inclusion and activism shaping 
the strategic engagements by environmental justice organisations with state and corporate 
actors. Section 4 focuses on the disjuncture between the interpretative frames of activists, 
business representatives, politicians, and the state that helps to shape this dynamic.  
 
2). Sites of democratic contention  
Macro-economic policy in post-apartheid South Africa has, since 1996, been determined 
by a framework known as GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution). GEAR 
imposes ‘neoliberal’ fiscal austerity from a national level downwards, at the same time as 
national government remains committed to the roll-out of basic needs to citizens. This 
latter imperative is devolved downwards to the local state, restructured according to 
principles of ‘developmental local government’ (Parnell et al 2002), whereby municipal 
authorities attempt to combine pro-growth and pro-poor economic strategies. The 
contradiction between the costs of service delivery and nationally imposed constrictions 
on revenue has generated an array of highly localised political mobilisations (Hart 2003). 
This scalar relationship between national fiscal policy and local state capacity is overlain 
by the inherited uneven geography of capital accumulation in South African cities. The 
nationally-derived imperative to promote economic growth is focussed on specific 
‘spaces of dependence’ where fixed investments of plant, machinery, and skilled labour 
have been built up over time (cf. Cox 1998). This leads some localities being identified as 
key sites of nationally significant strategic economic growth. It is one such place that we 
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focus on here, the so-called Southern Industrial Basin (SIB) in Durban. The spatialization 
of the accumulation processes comes together here in distinctive ways: South Durban is 
both a key cluster of industrial activity, particularly in petro-chemicals, as well as a key 
transport hub for the circulation of capital, given its adjacency to the port of Durban. In 
South Durban, the dynamic interaction of state imperatives of accumulation, delivery, 
and legitimation (cf. Dryzek et al 2003) is geographically articulated in such as way as to 
make this a site of democratic contention (Figure 1).  
In the post-apartheid period, the SIB has been consistently identified by the local state 
and the national government as a strategic location for further economic growth. The 
‘envisioning’ of South Durban revolves around the role of the SIB in a wider city-wide 
framework of economic development, shaped in turn by national economic imperatives 
as well as by particular policy understandings of ‘globalisation’ and urban economies 
(Robinson 2006). The strategic vision of South Durban’s future centres on enhancing 
investment in high value added manufacturing sectors such as chemicals, plastics, 
metalworking and motor industry, thereby building on the potential for clustering in and 
around the SIB and the transport hub around the port. 
 The re-envisioning of Durban’s economic futures has taken place at the same time as 
new frameworks for environmental governance has been put in place. The formal 
legislative framework for environmental governance in South Africa is laid down in 
1998’s National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), the product of sustained 
participatory and consultative policy-making including stakeholders from civil society 
(Oelefse et al 2005). NEMA provides the formal framework for the selective inclusion of 
social movement actors in environmental decision-making around specified local issues. 
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This system post-apartheid environmental governance is a version of “dependent 
ecological modernization” (Sonnenfeld 2002, 23), in which a strong impulse to further 
develop ‘dirty’ industries rubs up against externally sourced global norms of 
environmental governance procedures which open up narrow channels for public 
participation. In such contexts, it is likely that the role of civil society and social 
movement actors will be more contentious than envisaged in advanced capitalist liberal 
democracies of the North: they are likely to combine the role of “inside players” with that 
of “outside influences” (ibid., 21).  
South Durban first emerged as a publicly identified ‘environmental hotspot’ in the mid-
1990s, during a period of intense administrative restructuring of the local state. The 
newly unified local government commissioned a ‘State of the Environment’ report for the 
whole city in 1996, and then in turn a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the 
South Durban basin in 1999 (Freund 2001). The SEA argued that resources required for 
dealing with the areas chronic pollution problems would be generated by attracting 
further investment in industrial development. The SEA process established the terms 
around which the contentious politics of South Durban’s future have been organised ever 
since. Growth-led development visions for the future of the SIB run up against the long-
standing grievances of local communities over the quality of living environments in the 
area.  Industrial pollution has been a pressing concern for the predominantly poor back 
local communities in South Durban for decades. These communities have their origins in 
the forced relocation of the 1950s and 1960s under the Group Areas Act, when they were 
moved into an area already ear-marked for further industrial development (Scott 2003). 
The residential areas of South Durban suffer from high levels of air, ground, and water 
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pollution, not least because of their proximity to two oil refineries, a paper and pulp 
factory, and myriad petro-chemical plants. This proximity to sites of national strategic 
economic importance has, however, provided the opportunity for SMOs to generate 
highly visible and contentious expressions of the tensions between ‘dirty growth’ on the 
one hand, and social justice and delivery imperatives on the other. Mobilisation around 
environmental pollution and the industrial futures of the SIB has been the spark for the 
development of a broader environmental justice movement around ‘dirty growth’ that has 
linked other pollution ‘hotspots’ around South Africa into a transnational network of 
advocacy, research, activism, and lobbying.   
The capacity of SMOs in South Durban to take advantage of this opportunity is, 
however, also a function of distinctive histories of activism in these communities, as well 
as on the capacity to build spatially extensive networks of engagement. Variations in 
levels of community mobilisation are shaped by the relationship between sedimented, 
place-specific capacities for community mobilisation and activist leadership on the one 
hand (Nelson 2003), and the development of new frameworks of state coordinated 
consultation and participation on the other (Stokke et al 2003). In South Durban, new 
forms of mobilisation have emerged in the last decade around the health impacts of 
poorly regulated industrial development. In particular, these have focussed on the health 
impacts of air and ground pollution. This upsurge of mobilisation is related to the long 
history of civic organisation and political activism in this area (Chari 2004). In 
Wentworth and Merebank in particular, there is a sedimented network of civic and 
community-based organisations (CBOs) whose origins go back to mobilisations against 
apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s. Long-established CBOs including the Merebank 
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Residents Association (MRA) and the Wentworth Development Forum (WDF) had 
significant input into the development of the ANC’s policy on environmental issues in 
the early 1990s.  
The crucial step in the projection of community grievances around pollution into the 
public realm came with the formation of an umbrella organization to focus on 
environmental concerns in 1996, the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance 
(SDCEA). SDCEA has had a variable membership, made up of ‘member organizations’ 
and ‘affiliated organisations’, including civic organizations, church groups, women’s 
organizations, ratepayer’s associations, as well as environmental groups. Its strongest 
base is in the former Indian area of Merebank and the coloured area of Wentworth, but it 
has succeeded in coordinating campaigns and mobilization around issue-specific 
concerns across spatially separated, racially and class-divided communities, including the 
Indian area of Isipingo and the conservative white area of the Bluff. The racial 
exclusivity of these areas has been broken down by residential mobility in the decades 
since the first democratic elections of 1994, so that these areas now also include 
significant numbers of black African residents previously restricted to African townships. 
SDCEA’s reach into the historical African townships of South Durban, Lamontville and 
Umlazi, is however much more restricted. Each of these geographical communities has 
specific environmental concerns, depending on their proximity to particular facilities. 
There is, however, shared exposure to transportation of hazardous materials, pipelines 
leakages, and, because of the distinctive micro-climate of the South Durban basin, air 
pollution. Through SDCEA’s concerted efforts, South Durban’s two oil refineries (two of 
only four in the country) have become emblematic of environmental justice conflict. One 
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of them, the SAPREF refinery, is jointly owned by two multi-national oil companies, 
Shell and BP. The other one, the Engen Refinery, is owned by Petronas, Malaysia’s state-
owned oil and gas company. 
SDCEA’s activities since its formation have been shaped by the fragmented politics 
between communities in South Durban, and partly of fluctuations in civil society 
mobilization over the last decade. SDCEA does not have a broad-based mass 
membership; it is an umbrella organization that draws its legitimacy from the 
organizations who are members. This distinctive representative structure generates 
particular strategic pathways as SDCEA negotiates the imperatives of different scenes of 
activism and deliberation. At the same time, SDCEA is highly dependent on informal 
networks into local communities. For example, its ability to report and publicize 
pollution incidents such as pipeline leaks, accidents or illegal flarings at refineries, rests 
on linkages with local union members, doctors, and schoolteachers.   
SDCEA’s networked structure and its variable membership is a practical response to 
the problem of mobilizing spatially separate and socially divided communities around 
issue specific and often highly technical issues. At the same time, in so far as this reflects 
underlying differences and inequalities between communities, this organizational 
structure remains one source of potential weakness for SDCEA. The difficulty of 
reaching into African townships of Lamontville and Umlazi, which are characterized by 
political cultures in which ANC structures are much more tightly integrated into 
communities through councilors, branch structures, and ward committees, has become a 
stick with which the Municipality’s ANC leadership have been able to question the 
legitimacy of SDCEA as representative of the residents of the SIB as a whole. This lack 
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of reach into African townships is linked to the perception that environmental 
organizations in South Durban have an anti-growth agenda. ANC ward councilors for 
these townships are wary of identifying too closely with SDCEA’s activities, at the same 
as acknowledging the relevance of the grievances over pollution for their own 
constituencies.  It has become almost routine for ANC leaders in the Municipality such 
as the Mayor and the City Manager to publicly question the legitimacy of environmental 
SMOs such as SDCEA, raising the charge that they are unrepresentative of all 
communities in the SIB and, implicitly when not explicitly, accusing them of racial 
exclusivity.   
SDCEA’s activities are therefore enabled and constrained by the relationships of trust 
and legitimacy it is able to forge with other organisations more strongly embedded in 
local communities. SDCEA is the organisational medium for a mode of cross-community 
mobilisation between racially divided social groups around issue-specific concerns. The 
‘translation’ of the SDCEA model has been an explicit objective of activists, primarily 
mediated by Groundwork, a national environmental NGO based in Pietermaritzburg. 
Groundwork was formed in 1999 as a specialist organisation focussing on pollution 
issues and hazardous waste. Its leading personnel have strong personal linkages with 
South Durban environmental activism stretching back to the late 1980s and 1990s. Along 
with the Environmental Justice Networking Forum out of which it grew, Groundwork is 
the key actor in the emergence of an environmental justice movement in post-apartheid 
South Africa (Cock 2004). It is actively involved in grassroots projects aimed at 
mobilising particular communities, and has been crucial to the projection of the 
grievances in South Durban onto wider stages. Groundwork’s founder and Director, 
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Bobby Peek, sees its main task quite explicitly as ‘movement building’:  
“Groundwork is based on a couple of values and principles. One is to try and 
develop an ability of communities to challenge other stakeholders or other people 
or develop that challenging capacity, and the second thing is to be able to link 
community struggles - internationally”. (Interview, Durban, 10th February 2004).    
This objective is based on an explicit commitment to an inclusive, activist model of 
democratization. Groundwork was set up after the initial period of post-apartheid 
environmental politics was completed, when national legislation that recognised 
principles of environmental justice and community participation was passed in 1998:  
“And we just said ‘Fine, having done all that we still need some action’. You know, 
we still need a type of vibrant, action based, active based civil society on 
environmental issues” (Interview, Durban, 10th February 2004).    
Groundwork sees its own role as one of networking and capacity-building between 
communities and between communities and other actors, such as international donors, 
scientific experts, and media. Groundwork is the organisational vehicle through which 
South Durban activists have been able to mobilise various resources to sustain local 
mobilisation and put pressure on national government and multinational corporations. 
This ‘space of engagement’ (cf. Cox 1998) links up specialised advocacy organisations 
with a shared focus on health and industrial pollution. Groundwork is the key agent of 
brokerage within this network, making connections between sites and actors and helping 
to establish at least temporary political identities between them (McAdam et al 2001, 
142-3); and also of modelling the SDCEA example of cross-community mobilisation in 
other pollution ‘hotspots’ around South Africa (Tarrow 2001, 15).  
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In the next section we track the emergence of this spatially extensive but issue-specific 
environmental justice network as it passes through South Durban. We focus in particular 
on the ways in which pressures on SMOs towards inclusion – to compromise and 
deliberate – are offset by countervailing pressures to mobilise opposition outside of 
formal arenas of policy and governance.  
 
3). Dynamic democratization and environmental justice  
Air pollution in particular has become emblematic of a broader problem of industrial 
pollution and environmental injustice in South Durban, articulated in terms of a history 
of lack of recognition and systematic secrecy. Mobilisation around these issues has in 
turn centred on demands for both substantive and procedural justice: that there should 
be no more unplanned development, that future development should adhere to the 
highest standards of environmental quality, and that businesses are held accountable for 
their past actions; and that those affected by past and future industrial development 
should be part of the decision-making process. These principles are clearly set out in 
SDCEA’s vision statement published to mark it’s 10
th
 anniversary (SDCEA, 2006).  
These two sets of demands are not easily squared; the inclusion of activists and SMOs 
in formal deliberative procedures has in part served to underscore a relative lack of 
progress on more substantive demands, and this in turn helps to account for the range 
of more oppositional strategies that they have continued to deploy. The tension 
between them helps account for the juggling by SMOS of more inclusive, deliberative 
strategies with more adversarial forms of activism.     
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3.i). Participation in deliberative forums  
The most important of the new procedures established by NEMA to facilitate and 
promote public participation in environmental governance is a re-vamped Environmental 
Impact Assessment system. The EIA system requires that the provincial government sees 
to it that businesses seek representations and opinions from affected communities. It is a 
means through which a three-way engagement between state, capital, and civil society 
actors has been institutionalized. In KwaZulu-Natal, the overwhelming majority of EIAs 
handled by the provincial environmental management department pertain to proposed 
industrial development in South Durban. One of the successes of environmental justice 
mobilization since the 1990s has been to establish SDCEA as the ‘certified’ 
representative of local communities in this EIA process (Scott et al, 2002). This strategy 
is still driven by the logic of inclusion in environmental governance, and it has required a 
set of organizational transformations in SDCEA, with an increasing emphasis on external 
fundraising, professional administration, and formal advocacy. The flip-side of this 
inclusion is that SDCEA has become a ‘dumping ground’ for EIA’s. Faced with an 
increasing volume of EIA applications, SDCEA has found itself faced with the problem 
of ‘stakeholder burnout’ as it struggles to cope with the technical and scientific demands 
required to make participation in these procedures meaningful. In terms of substantive 
outcomes, this engagement reaps few tangible benefits. Virtually every EIAs is  
approved. In effect, the EIA process supports incremental industrial expansion, and 
SDCEA’s inclusion in deliberative procedures therefore does little address their more 
fundamental demands for more meaningful participation by local communities in the 
long-term planning of the SIB.   
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In principle, the EIA process provides for the inclusion of the interests of marginalized 
groups into the decision-making process (cf. Scott and Oelofse 2005). In practice, 
however, lack of resources and capacity means that SMOs do not have equal power 
compared to local businesses or large multinational corporations seeking further 
development in the area. This style of participation requires SMOs to compromise on 
their most fundamental objectives:   
“Is the very legalistic, systematic process the way to respond? Because you just 
get sucked in a process. You start having to understand their jargon. You have to 
understand engaging in their debates and how they see things and how they put 
things on the table. Whereas, what you actually want at one level is a damn clean 
environment.” (Bobby Peek, Interview, Durban, 10th February 2004).    
It is this tension between procedural inclusion and substantive change that helps account 
for SDCEA’s continuing recourse to more contentious forms of mobilization.  
While SDCEA has been included in formal deliberative processes such as EIAs, as well 
as succeeding in having new procedures for participation and consultation around air 
pollution and health monitoring, this does not mean that they have forsaken more 
contentious repertoires, as SDCEA’s Chairperson, Des D’Sa, explains: “At the same time 
we said we are not going to give up the struggle in the streets. It is important to keep the 
struggle in the streets.” (Interview, Durban, 9th August 2003). 
Fully aware of the limitations of inclusion in deliberative forums, D’Sa articulates an 
expansive, multifaceted understanding of the different forms ‘activism’ involves:  
“It means having regular public forums, it means writing regular letters to these 
government officials and politicians, it means when people don’t respond and are 
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afraid to deliver it means taking to the streets and doing a protest and, you know, 
constantly being in the media and showing them for what the are. That is what 
activism is all about, activism is about bringing a message across and there are 
many ways of doing it, protest is one of them, picketing is another one, writing 
letters is another one, getting to the media and going to meetings”. (Interview, 
Durban, 11
th
 February 2004).   
Here there is a clear sense that the purpose of ‘activism’ is to exert pressure on both the 
state and capital in order to shift the parameters of inclusive forums and deliberative 
procedures. Doing ‘activism’ therefore has an instrumental function, internally connected 
to more conciliatory practices of engagement in deliberative forums. But it also has an 
intrinsic dimension as a means through which representative, networked organisations 
like SDCEA and Groundwork maintain their own coherence and perform their legitimacy 
to their constituent memberships and broader publics. We now explore each of these 
dimensions of doing activism, and elaborate on the dynamic relationship between them.  
 
3.ii). Activism and enforcement  
Environmental justice SMOs from South Durban have adopted less conciliatory 
approaches in order to enforce formal commitments and procedures. These include legal 
challenges to the local and provincial government, aimed at forcing the state to engage 
more proactively with capital over pollution issues. SDCEA’s to pursue this course has 
depended on establishing links with the Cape Town based Legal Resources Centre 
(LRC), an NGO which provides legal services to poor and historically vulnerable people, 
and which has a long running involvement in environmental justice issues.  
 17
SDCEA and LRC have invoked constitutionally guaranteed legal rights to due process 
and procedural justice to force the provincial state to act in accordance with its formal 
obligations and enforce EIA procedures on businesses. An example is SDCEA’s 
challenge to the Mondi Paper Company’s application to build a new incinerator in 2003. 
After the two oil refineries, Mondi, part of the multinational Anglo-American group, is 
the third largest polluter in the South Durban area. SDCEA and the LRC successfully 
challenged the constitutionality of Mondi’s plans on the grounds of irregularities in the 
provincial government’s administration of EIA procedures. The long term effectiveness 
of this legal activism is limited. By 2005, Mondi had been given the go ahead for the 
incinerator (‘Mondi burner gets green light’, The Mercury, 18
th
 July 2005.   
Despite these limitations, the importance of this type of ‘impact litigation’ is twofold. 
Firstly, SDCEAs challenge of Mondi’s planned incinerator is an example of activism 
aimed at forcing state agencies to enforce existing legislative provisions. This sort of 
adversarial legal activism does have some effect in ensuring that legislated procedures of 
accountability, consultation, and appeal are followed by both state and capital. Secondly, 
this legal enforcement of the state’s formal obligations is also a means by which SMOs 
can gain some leverage with capital. The legal challenge to Mondi opened a space for 
negotiation with industry over its future plans. 
SDCEA’s legal strategy has been primarily focused on enforcing the obligations of 
provincial government, which is responsible for EIA application for new industrial 
development. But SMOs also engages in adversarial activism focused on existing sources 
of pollution. Groundwork has become increasingly active nationally around the 
enforcement of existing air pollution standards. They have targeted health officials of 
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local municipalities, accusing them of inaction and claiming that these officials have been 
prevented from taking legal action against big polluters in SIB (Health officials stink, say 
Durban residents’, Cape Times, 15
th
 September 2003). The response to these campaigns 
has varied from municipality to municipality: the legislative status of air pollution 
enforcement has remained unclear in the absence of air pollution legislation, only enacted 
in 2004. Officials in eThekwini have, however, become more and more vigorous in 
enforcing emission standards, creatively using local bye-laws which allow minimal fines 
for excessive emissions (‘Polluters can no longer evade watchdogs of environment, 
Business Day , 12
th
 August 2005). Even in the absence of formal legislation then, 
activism can be a means of applying pressure on state officials in a context in which the 
administrative capacities of the local state are in a state of flux.   
The dependent ecological modernization paradigm established by NEMA constructs 
scientific knowledge as a vector for engagement in participatory forums. This creates 
another opportunity for activism oriented towards effective enforcement. Local activists 
from South Durban have been drawn into a dynamic of international networking and 
fundraising in order to mobilize the resources of scientific expertise required by their 
inclusion environmental management systems, and also in order to exert pressure through 
media coverage. Groundwork has been crucial in brokering between SDCEA and 
national and international NGOs. For example, this has building a network of cooperative 
relationships between SDCEA, Groundwork, and the Danish environmental conservation 
organization DN (Danmarks Naturfredingsforening). From 2001 to 2004, a Danish 
government-funded collaboration between DN and SDCEA focused on various aspects of 
capacity-building. For both Groundwork, who initiated the project, and DN, the purpose 
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of their collaboration was to provide resources to enable SDCEA to engage with both 
government and business more effectively through scientific expertise. This requirement 
has become all the more important as SDCEA’s initial phase of activism in the late 1990s 
succeeded in having a new system of environmental and health monitoring, the ‘Multi-
Point Plan’ (MPP), set-up by national government in 2001.  
The MPP is the most substantive outcome of the sustained mobilization and activism in 
and around South Durban since 1995, culminating in 2000’s media campaigning. The 
MPP puts in place provisions for a systematic environmental monitoring system; for an 
objective health study; and for an integrated air quality management plan. It also 
empowers local government as the authority for environmental regulation, thereby 
shifting the institutional location of environmental conflict once again, opening new 
opportunities for further bureaucratized forms of engagement.  
The MPP is an inclusive, deliberative apparatus aimed at establishing consensus. It 
represents both a success for environmental activism, but also presents both new 
opportunities and threats which can follow from incorporation in such a technocratic, 
consensual deliberative forum. This is indicative of the dual strategy that faces SMOs in 
their interactions with state and capital on the one hand and their support base on the 
other:  
“Once you start to participate the feeling is generally – well lets start discussing 
mitigation measures rather than discussing ‘we don’t want it here’… so the 
question today in social movements is - do you get involved to try and work the 
system? Or do you stand outside the system and show up its contradictions?” 
Bobby Peek, Interview, Durban, 10
th
 February 2004).  
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DN’s resources have been crucial in enabling SDCEA to use the data generated by the 
MPP for further advocacy and mobilization. In particular DN has provided scientific 
expertise which enables SDCEA to make effective use of the data generated by the MPP. 
This support is acknowledged by the local government’s MPP Programme Manager: the 
MPP process generates extensive data about emissions: “And then they [SDCEA] send 
the results to us and say, what have you done about this?”. (Interview with Siva Chetty, 
Durban, 6
th
 February 2004).  
The collaboration between SDCEA, Groundwork and DN has been shaped by the 
different understandings of activism and advocacy, inclusion and opposition held by the 
South African organizations and the Danish NGO. The Danish participants in the 
collaboration are strongly committed to a deliberative strategy of engaging constructively 
with state and business, as a way of gaining more effective access to data. DN saw itself 
as enhancing SDCEA’s external communications strategy, with the aim of teaching 
SDCEA to “talk not shout” (Interview with Lone Alstrup, DN Local Action Project 
Coordinator, Copenhagen, 2
nd
 November 2005). DN’s perception was that SDCEA 
needed to move beyond the confrontational stance that it had developed from its 
inception in the 1990s, not least by acknowledging the industry had made significant 
strides to respond to community concerns. As Peek acknowledges, this strategic 
understanding is not easily aligned with the activist imaginary of South African SMOs:   
“I mean South Durban does find a bit of pressure on them but it’s not a pressure, 
it’s a pressure to do things very well, you know the Danish do it ‘this way’ and 
south Durban must do it ‘this way’. And we’ve had a couple of heated meetings, 
where we the Danes understood, okay we have to do it the African way.” 
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(Interview, Durban, 10
th
 February 2004). 
This tension between the strategic frames of the different actors implicated in contentious 
politics in South Durban is an index of basic division between the ‘behavioural’ 
objectives of organizations like DN, embedded in transnational advocacy networks, and 
national and locally accountable SMOs such as Groundwork and SDCEA: while the latter 
are engaged in contentious interaction with states and corporations, the former are 
oriented towards more routine and consensual transactions with these same actors (cf. 
Tarrow 2001, 12).  
This tension between contention and consensus is internalized in the strains that shape 
SDCEA’s activities its relationship with partners in this network of environmental justice 
mobilisation. It has become a more formalized NGO, with professional staff and external 
donor relationships oriented to increasing the organizations’ capacity to engage in what 
are often highly technical scientific consultation procedures. At the same time, SDCEA is 
an alliance of groups which are often highly localized with the South Durban area. As it 
has been drawn into deliberative procedures that have required the formalization and 
organizational transformation of SDCEA, so the strains in this mediated relationship with 
local communities have become more and more difficult to negotiate. And herein lays 
one reason why SDCEA is unable to straightforwardly adopt the deliberative strategy 
considered the norm by international advocacy groups such as DN: the dramaturgy of 
adversarial activism is one of the repertoires available to SDCEA to perform its 
legitimacy to local communities. As Chari (2004, 25) observes, SDCEA “does not 
command a steady mass base”, but “they can pull in a crowd for spectacular events by 
drawing on a variety of other community organisations”. 
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3.iii). Activism and legitimacy 
SDCEA has achieved success in becoming the ‘certified’ voice of environmental 
expertise amongst local communities in the SIB and more broadly in Durban. But as it 
has been drawn into inclusive, deliberative forms of engagement, and become more 
formalized as an organization, it has also maintained an array of informal protest and 
demonstration tactics. Recourse to forms of dramaturgical protest amongst environmental 
justice SMOs reflects the fundamental division between their substantive demands and 
the vision of environmental governance held by locally embedded industrial capital and 
the core economic growth imperatives of local and national state. SDCEA’s position is 
that “further expansion of industrial development in South Durban, without a clear 
management framework to protect people from the environmental and health impacts of 
development is not feasible” (SDCEA, Memo prepared for Multi-Point Plan Quarterly 
Forum Meeting, 13
th
 March 2003). The consistent demand of SMOs is for a moratorium 
on further development: “Any new development must be people centred. People First! 
People before Profits! Health before Wealth!” (SDCEA, 2006, 3). In contrast, the vision 
of ‘sustainable development’ held by business representatives such as the General 
Manager of the Mondi paper and pulp plant in South Durban is one in which further 
growth and environmental quality are complimentary: “We have to see this as a step-wise 
process - make money, improve emissions, make more money, make more 
improvements” (Minutes of Multi-Point Plan Quarterly Forum Meeting, 13th March 
2003). In this vision, further industrial development drives the dynamic of enhanced 
environmental sustainability.  
This vision underlies the strategic engagements by multinational capital embedded in 
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South Durban with local SMOs. Alongside forums such as the MPP, the EIA 
management system, and local state bureaucracies, contrasting visions of South Durban’s 
past and future are increasingly contested in forums initiated by economic actors 
embedded in the SIB. Shell, the co-owners of the SAPREF refinery in South Durban, 
have been one of the leading global players in the development of CSR programmes 
focused on stakeholder engagement and sustainable development. The translation of 
these global programmes to South Durban only came after the peak of publicity 
generated by SDCEA and Groundwork in 2000. In the wake of this concerted media 
campaign, Shell undertook a review the SAPREF refinery in 2002 as a means of 
addressing the history of contentious politics around pollution in South Durban. It 
acknowledged that SAPREF could not continue to rely on pre-1994 relationships with 
government “for their license to operate, but must instead proactively engage with a 
range of stakeholders” (2002 Social Performance Review: SAPREF Refinery, Durban, 
South Africa. July 2003, p. 12). SDCEA, however, was identified as an obstacle to 
developing more collaborative, partnership-based forms of engagement with local 
communities:  
“SDCEA has systematically hardened its stance versus the refinery, and is deeply 
distrustful of its outreach efforts to communities. At the same time, some of the 
NGOs that are part of SDCEA’s coalition (as well as community residents more 
generally) have come to question certain aspects of SDCEA’s position, particularly 
its assertion to be the only representative body of the communities surrounding the 
refinery, and feel that SDCEA’s rigidity has come to constitute an obstacle to work 
(sic) collaboratively with SAPREF for the betterment of the communities they 
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serve” (Ibid., 24).  
The review’s distinction between ‘more extreme critics’ and ‘moderate elements’ in local 
communities formed the basis for the vision of a corporate social investment strategy 
aimed at building relationships with ‘stakeholders’ through consultation, employment, 
building links with local suppliers, and investing in capacity-building for local 
community organisations:  
“‘Healthy’ organizations make good partners. The healthier an organization is, the 
more it is able to mobilize constituency and garner support. In addition, a series of 
strong local NGOs that work collaboratively with SAPREF on development issues 
is probably the best ‘shield’ against negative press, and certainly an enhancement 
to reputational issues. To that effect, SAPREF should dedicate a proportion of its 
Social Investment funds to build the organisational capacity of community-based 
NGOs in Wentworth and Merebank.” (Ibid., 37).  
This is a business-friendly  model of participatory development, translated from a Dutch 
context to South Africa, in which ‘corporate social investment’ is to be used to build 
relationships business interests with local service delivery priorities. It is a vision 
explicitly aimed at engendering a more conciliatory, cooperative and less confrontational 
engagement between capital and local communities, preferably unmediated by state 
regulation or legislation.  
There is a fundamental incommensurability tension between the ‘inclusive’ impulse of 
corporate social programmes aimed at building strategically beneficial partnerships, and 
the demands of SMOs for accountability and redress of past injustice. The discourse of 
environmental racism adopted by South African activists focuses not just compensation 
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for current pollution, but also makes demands for historical accountability and redress. 
This division over the degree to which past injustice has been adequately put right or 
whether a line should be drawn under the abuses of apartheid is fundamental to the 
different interpretations of how organisations like SDCEA and Groundwork should 
engage in the politics of environmental governance. This network of environmental 
justice organisations is embedded in localities in which persistent exposure to 
environmental risks is entangled with lived histories of the injustices and legacies of 
apartheid. SAPREF’s adoption of Shell’s Social Performance agenda, in so far as it is 
couched in a vocabulary of corporate social investment rather than responsibility, is 
implicated in a wider attempt to avoid calls for redress for the inequalities inherited from 
apartheid of which they were a beneficiary (Fig 2005). The response, in South Africa as 
elsewhere, is a social movement discourse of ‘corporate accountability’ (Lund-Thomsen 
2005), one which Groundwork has been active in translating into the South Durban 
context (see Groundwork 2002).  
SAPREF have implemented this new strategy since 2004. One effect has been to 
heighten the difficulties involved in negotiating between the different interests of the 
organisations involved in SDCEA: “There has been a big battle being waged within the 
local communities about which of us is taking funds from the industry or fighting for the 
environment.” (Des D’Sa, Interview, Durban, 9th August 2003). Various organisations 
associated with SDCEA have become involved in corporate initiatives around poverty 
alleviation, environmental education, support of broad range of community 
organisations. SDCEA, on the other hand, has an imperative not to be seen to be ‘getting 
in bed with industry’ by accepting this source of funding:  
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It is used in another way now to create division, to destroy the voice of civil 
society. [...] There is a lot of funds being pumped in by major industries in South 
Durban into those communities to try to stop the voice of civil society.” (Des D’Sa, 
Interview, Durban, 11th February 2003).  
In contrast to corporate strategies of social investment, stakeholder forums and 
voluntary agreements, SMOs like SDCEA and Groundwork actively demand a strong 
and engaged role for national and local state actors in regulating and enforcing 
environmental standards. They are deeply suspicious of models of inclusion that 
circumvent the formal democratic institutions of state regulation and legislation. SDCEA, 
for example, sees its primary role as one of aiming to “make our government work” 
(SDCEA Memo, 28th March 2002). This alternative vision of the democracy is captured 
in SDCEA’s ‘Ten commandments of good environmental governance to be upheld by 
Shell and the South African government’, tabled in a letter to Shell in 2003 (SDCEA 
Memo, April 2003):  
“1). Thou shall have a pollution reduction plan. […]. 
2). Thou shall not rely on voluntary agreements for pollution reduction but on the 
law. […]. 
3). Thou shall protect the people’s environment and health against pollution caused 
by old and leaking infrastructures by replacing it. […]. 
4). Polluters shall be held accountable. […]. 
5). People shall not loose (sic) their property and land due to industrial 
mismanagement and activity. […]. 
6). Thou shall not withhold information from your neighbours. […]. 
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7). Thou shall not develop and uphold law to prohibit access to information on 
environment, health and safety. […]. 
8). Government will protect its people from industrial accidents by developing 
evacuation plans. […]. 
9). Thou shall have an air pollution monitoring system. […]. 
10). Government will monitor peoples’ health. […].”
 
 
These demands capture the range of community concerns that SDCEA articulates in the 
public realm; they also indicate the degree to which environmental justice activism is 
oriented towards pressurizing state actors to enforce legal and regulatory obligations on 
nationally and multinationally owned capital located in South Durban. Protests, 
demonstrations, and mass meetings have therefore continued to be an important element 
of SDCEA’s activities over the last decade.  
Adversarial activism and dramaturgical modes of mobilisation expose some of the 
tensions underlying the dynamic growth and transformation of environmental justice 
politics in South Durban. SMOs draw on a repertoire of mobilisation and protest inherited 
from anti-apartheid politics. But these strategies are not automatically transferable to 
post-apartheid contexts, shaped by the changing dynamics of community identities and 
social relations, as well as changing organisational dynamics as community-based 
organisations (CBOs) have switched increasingly towards service-delivery functions. 
Within SDCEA and its affiliated organisations, different actors hold contrasting 
perspectives on the source of SDCEA’s representative legitimacy. Over its history, 
various organisations and activists have left or loosened their connections with SDCEA. 
Some activists hold that SDCEA’s public mandate must be based in a constant, iterative 
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process of calling and holding meetings in which mandates are given and confirmed. In 
this vision, an organisations’ public mandate is garnered and maintained through high 
levels of community participation; SMOs are understood as delegates of communities. 
But SDCEA’s mandate is not derived directly from participation of a membership base; it 
is mediated by the member organisations of which it is made up:  
“We get our mandate from public forums, you know we have regular meetings in 
the public domain, we have mandates from the schools, churches and all the other 
organisations that we work with, to do what work we do”. (Des D’Sa, Interview, 
Durban, 9
th
 August 2003). 
In principle at least, it is these organisations that derive their mandates from highly 
mobilised active community participation, as one former SDCEA activist explains:   
“Now the way reps are supposed to function is that they come from another 
organisation and they have like a whole lot of like strings of attachments in terms 
of in their community, and they are meant to follow certain procedures to ensure 
that there is a sense of democracy in the community, that the decisions that they 
take are based on the fact that they’ve gone out and found out what people need”. 
(Michelle Simons, Interview, Durban, 12
th
 February 2004).  
The practicability of this model has been strained by transformations in the nature of 
local activism in communities in South Durban since 1994. Former SDCEA activists 
recognise that the increasing dependence of SDCEA on donor funding is an inevitable 
response to the need to engage in technocratic and scientific modes of public 
participation, they also see this as a reason for the lack of attention to grassroots 
mobilisation in local communities. In contrast, an active member of SDCEA’s executive 
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committee acknowledges the difficulty that SDCEA has in maintaining its legitimacy 
with local communities, but puts this down to heightened apathy:  
“You are having your elections, you are running democratically, people I think are 
happy, but they don’t come in and they don’t contribute and that kind of thing. 
They are quite comfortable with you taking their issue and running with it. We 
don’t have the direct grassroots accountability, we do what we think is right and we 
carry on” (Rajen Naidoo, Interview, Durban, 7
th
 August 2004.  
While these two perspectives differ over the reasons for the relative lack of active 
mobilisation around environmental concerns, and over the degree to which community 
mobilisation should be the responsibility of an organisation like SDCEA, both 
acknowledge that the absence of sustained popular mobilisation around these issues is a 
persistent problem for SMOs.  
SDCEA has had to negotiate changing dynamics of community participation, including 
transformation in the way in which previously highly active local ANC branches are 
organised, in its core support areas of Merebank and Wentworth, at the same time as it 
tries to reach out and sustain support in other communities characterised by distinctive 
socio-economic and political histories of their own. SDCEA is already a network of 
organisations, and its consolidation has in turn involved it being drawn into wider 
networks at national and international level. In part, recourse to activist repertoires is an 
expression of the distance between SDCEA and its local constituencies, a distance 
exacerbated by the organisational transformation that it has undergone as it has been 
included into expertise-heavy forums of public consultation and participatory. 
Nonetheless, SDCEA’s  form of mediated legitimacy, resting on the claim that its 
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legitimacy lies with residents through the support of representative organisations 
(SDCEA memo, ND), has been effectively translated to other pollution ‘hotspots’ in 
South Africa through the active efforts of Groundwork’s national campaigning for 
enhanced clean air legislation. It is an organisational structure that Groundwork has 
modelled elsewhere to mobilise otherwise diverse, separate interests into a national 
campaign. The SDCEA model has been translated to communities in Sasolburg, 
Secunda, Vanderbijlpark, Richards Bay, and Cape Town, re-framed as ‘fenceline 
communities’ living and working in ‘hotspots’ and sharing a set of grievances around the 
health impacts of unrestricted ‘dirty growth’ (‘Air Quality Management in Industrial 
Hotspots in South Africa’, Groundwork Memo to Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 3rd April 2003).  
 
4). Activism and the norms of deliberation  
The ongoing recourse to adversarial and confrontational styles of oppositional activism 
is, therefore, an effect of various factors. It reflects the fundamental limitations of 
participatory procedures when it comes to addressing substantive demands for a 
moratorium on industrial development, since this demand runs directly against the 
economic imperative to promote further expansion in the SIB. But it also reflects the 
distinctive organisational structure of environmental activism that has grown up around 
the contested futures of South Durban: SDCEA has a highly mediated relationship with 
its key constituents, which means that it is obliged to make use of protest repertoires that 
run against the conciliatory logic embedded in formal procedures adopted by both state 
and capital; it is also part of a spatially extensive network of transnational advocacy 
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whose activities often centre on set-piece events of spectacular protest aimed at 
generating maximum public attention in various media. These styles of activism are part 
of the same dynamic through which SDCEA and Groundwork have successfully engaged 
in more inclusive and deliberative forums. But they sit uncomfortably alongside one 
another.  
The complex relationship between local, national and transnational SMOs in this 
network is at the heart of the systematic conflict of interpretations between social 
movement actors and corporate and state representatives over the validity of activist 
strategies. For example, Local ward councillors have, for the most part, a negative 
perspective on SDCEA’s activism, although this in part reflects their own difficulties in 
engaging with new, re-drawn districts combining previously divided communities. 
Councillors have also often been much more closely involved with corporate investment 
programmes in the SIB. Initiatives by business to address environmental concerns of 
communities affected by pollution have consistently run up against the diverging 
assumptions of business representatives that community-based organisations can speak 
for and decide on behalf of local communities, and those organisations’ own 
understanding that any discussions in such forums are only one aspect of broader 
caucusing with local communities. This is itself an indication of the sensitivity towards 
the charge that SDCEA in particular has its strongest linkages in just two localities, 
Merebank and Wentworth (SAPREF, ‘Notes of Community Liaison Forum Meeting’, 6th 
November 2003). Social movement activists are keenly aware of the danger of being 
‘steamrollered’ into agreeing to decisions in institutional contexts in which they are 
relatively disadvantaged. But in turn, their insistence on ‘caucusing’ outside of 
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stakeholder forums is interpreted by business as recalcitrance and obstruction (SAPREF, 
‘Invitation to Community Liaison Forum (CLF) Meeting’, 16
th
 April 2004).      
The local government official with lead responsibility for environmental management 
systems in the Municipality acknowledges the role of community organisations in the 
changing agenda of environmental governance in the decade since 1994, but regrets what 
she sees as a lack of positive contribution: “I think they have played a key role, I suppose 
the question is that key role has largely been through protest politics which has really 
quite a negative sense”. (Debra Roberts, Interview, Durban, 30
th
 July 2003). This 
construal reflects a model of environmental governance in which civil society actors are 
seen as primary playing a supporting role to enable environmental administrators to 
promote a green, conservation-led environmental agenda within local government. 
Likewise, provincial officials involved in administering EIA procedures also express 
their frustration at the difficulty of aligning the different imperatives and time-scales that 
dictate how business and SMOs from South Durban approach the EIA system. They see 
SMOs unrelentingly negative in their attitude to proposals for expansion of existing 
industrial operations: “It is a big problem that you have there, you know, they are not 
even willing to sit down and try and talk about it” (Timothy Fasheun, KZN Department 
of Environment and Agricultural Affairs, Interview, Pietermaritzburg, 13
th
 February 
2004). And the City Manager also sees SDCEA as a source of trouble:  
“I think that the difficulties has been that the community leaders, have often, even 
though they remain signatories in that plan [the MPP], I think at times have not 
understood that at times they have got to give a degree of leadership and saying 
listen, we have accepted this, it’s not our plan, it’s a mediated solution.” (Mike 
 33
Sutcliffe, Interview, Durban, 4
th
 August 2003).  
This set of observations by administrators and officials are indicative of a broadly shared 
frame of reference amongst state officials, business leaders, and ANC politicians. Formal, 
deliberative environmental governance in South Africa puts a premium on norms of 
participation, conciliation, and consensus. Any departure from these norms is looked on 
as obstructive, and even as an index of the lack of legitimacy of SMOs who adopt such 
adversarial activism.  
These post-apartheid norms govern the dramaturgy and objectives of public forums in 
the city (cf. Hajer 2005). But when these procedural norms come up against fundamental 
disagreement over substantive goals, SMOs are driven to adopt more contentious forms 
of engagement. This underlies the imperative for SMOs in South Durban to juggle 
deliberative and activist repertoires. Those involved in this network of environmental 
justice organisations are well aware of how this dual imperative is prone to 
misinterpretation, but they identify a failure amongst state officials and business leaders 
to appreciate the demands that determine these strategies:    
“The reaction was to say they are deliberately trying to frustrate the process, they 
are anti-development, they are not trying to participate in a meaningful and positive 
good faith way, so Ja, leave them out of it, we are now going to just proceed 
without them. Some of the tactics I have seen employed I can see how they can 
give rise to those perceptions, but at the same time the government and the 
consultants clearly have no understanding of the huge pressures that community 
groupings are working under” (Adrian Pole, Legal Resources Centre, Interview, 
Durban, 12
th
 February 2004). 
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In turn, the recourse to adversarial activist strategies makes the efforts of SMOs to be 
included in more deliberative participatory forums that much more difficult:  
“I know the city is not too happy you know, you don’t want someone that’s up 
you all the time, you know writing letters, sending you e-mails: ‘This is what’s 
wrong. That’s what’s wrong. What are you doing about this? What are you doing 
about that?’ They don’t want those sorts of people, they want nice guys, people 
that can sit down with them and have a decent conversation: ‘We don’t want to 
talk to people like you rebels’”. (Des D’Sa, Interview, Durban, 11
th
 February 
2003). 
And what divides these interpretative frames is the distinctive understanding of 
democracy that underwrites the activities of environmental justice SMOs:  
“Now the community is just seen as a bunch of radicals that are aborting 
development, but that’s not what it is you know and if there is to be this, you know, 
responsible economic and social investment in South Durban then it has to be done 
with a type of participation that’s active and involved”. (Michelle Simons, 
Interview, Durban, 12
th
 February 2004).     
In short, the values being enacted in the contestation by SMOs of the parameters of the 
formal deliberative forums of environmental governance are ones in which oppositional 
activism is considered not only legitimate, but an essential aspect of the effective 
realisation of the participatory and representative objectives of those forums.    
 
5). Conclusion: contested future, contested past  
Environmental justice activists in South Durban have forged an effective organizational 
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network that links previously divided communities, and reaches out beyond the city. In 
the process, South Durban has become a key site in the emergence of an environmental 
justice movement, embedded in the scalar politics of accumulation and social 
reproduction and a place-based history of activism, and connected up with an emergent 
national and transnational network of advocacy focused on issues of industrial pollution, 
waste, and public health (cf. Bulkeley 2005).  
Contentious activist strategies appear to be at the opposite end of the spectrum to the 
highly formal styles of participation represented by inclusion of civil society 
representatives in EIA procedures. But the relationship between them is an internal, 
dynamic one, shaped by the multiple and competing imperatives that a network of 
environmental activism such as this has to respond to. The limits of inclusive forums, 
which generate an impulse towards organisational specialisation, generate an ongoing 
imperative to maintain an activist stance aimed at shifting the parameters under which 
those inclusive forums are organised. It is in the relationship between these deliberative 
and activist strategies that one can identify the emergence of an effective space of 
democratic opposition. We can now returning to the two criteria for assessing the 
contribution of civil society actors in institutionalising opposition as a legitimate aspect 
of democratic politics that we identified in Section 1. Firstly, the primary achievement of 
the environmental justice network we have discussed here is to have established pollution 
as a significant issue to be taken account of in calculations of development pathways. 
And secondly, they have succeeded in establishing new structures of accountability, such 
as the MPP, in which the legitimacy of community organizations as having a voice in the 
public realm is recognized. Furthermore, this example has many of the characteristics 
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identified by Dryzek (2005) as criteria of the democratizing potential of effective social 
movement mobilization in divided societies, in which the balance between consensual 
deliberation and agonistic activist is always under negotiation: it involves ongoing 
engagement with a variety of public spheres; it is issue-specific; it is loosely connected to 
state apparatuses; and it is situated transnationally.  
The case of environmental justice politics in and beyond South Durban therefore 
illustrates that SMOs are able to pursue ‘dualistic’ strategies combining the strategic 
rationality of inclusion aimed at gaining reforms from the state (and capital), as well as 
the discursive politics aimed at changing identities and affiliations in civil and political 
society (Dryzek 1996, 484). Inclusion in formal procedures of consultation and 
participation conceal the ways in which structural inequalities skew deliberative 
practices in favour of powerful actors (Young 2001, 671). This is one reason why 
SMOs continue to have recourse to more contentious forms of mobilisation outside of 
deliberative forums. On the other hand, it is unwise to assume that the impact of 
movements only comes from remaining outside the state and economy and applying 
external pressure. We have seen that a key dimension of social movement activity in 
this case is focussed on ‘making government work’, and this is indicate of an implicit 
acknowledgement amongst participants in this movement that, as Young (1999, 151) 
democratically legitimated states “potentially and sometimes actually exhibit uniquely 
important virtues to support social justice in ways no other social processes do”.  
The strategies adopted by environmental justice organisations in Durban in the last 
decade can, then, only be understood in light of the genuine democratization of 
procedural practices in environmental governance since 1994. These organisations 
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combine inclusive and deliberative strategies: “We do both, one is that we do activism 
and we also negotiate”. (Des D’Sa, Interview, Durban, 11
th
 February 2003). Combining 
both of these strategies is a difficult task for activists and campaigners, involving 
strategic choices concerning when to engage and when to oppose. Inclusion in forums 
such as the MPP, and participation in EIA management systems, has not fundamentally 
altered the prevalent economic vision for the future of South Durban. The central focus of 
environmental organizations in the decade after 1994 focused on establishing pollution as 
an issue, and in turn on forcing government and business to move seriously towards 
establishing an evidence base that could establish where responsibility for the causes and 
alleviation of pollution should lie. But questions of responsibility extend beyond which 
industries are emitting which toxins, or whether government or businesses carry the 
primary burden for addressing these emissions. The future of the SIB is also being shaped 
by contending visions of South Durban’s past. Economistic discourses of a new 
beginning in the democratic South Africa, in which businesses blame bad planning for 
the harms that communities lay at their door, are countered by claims that capital must be 
held accountable by government for its past abuses. And between these competing 
visions of accountability, liability and responsibility there lie fundamentally different 
understandings of the means and ends of democracy.  
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